RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The defendant, in accordance with powers conferred by its
charter, levied an assessment of a tax for the cost of street
paving on abutting lands owned by plaintiff. The
Tax Assesscharter provided that after the apportionment of
ment:
Due Procesof the assessment, the same should be published in
Law

some newspaper for ten days and that any complaints, etc., could be made in writing by land owners within
thirty days, and would be heard and determined by the City
Council before the passage of any assessing ordinance. Complaints were duly filed by the plaintiff, but no notice was given
of time for a hearing and the assessing ordinance was passed
without there having been any. Held, due process of law demands something more than a mere opportunity to submit
written objections. He who is entitled to a hearing has a
right to support his allegations by argument and proof. Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 21o U. S. 373.
In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, Mr. Justice
Miller said concerning the "due process of law" clause, "there
is wisdom in the ascertaining the intent and application of
such an important phrase in the Federal Constitution by the
gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion." In accord with this idea, the meaning of "due process of law" has
been gradually worked out in a long line of cases.
In questions of the assessment of property to pay for improvements that have benefited it, the amount of each assessment depends upon the value of the property, and is
therefore a judicial act. Hagar v. Reclamation District, iii
U. S. 701. For that reason property owners must be given an
opportunity to be heard by the body making the assessment
(Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127), but
the state legislature may provide that such hearing shall be
conclusive. Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 31o. The-question of
what notice of the levy of an assessment is necessary is one
of appropriateness to the nature of the tax, and notice by publication has been held sufficient in the case of an assessment
upon abutting real estate to pay for improvements. Lent v.
Tillson, 14o U. S. 316.
In addition to the above interpretations of the "due process
of law" clause as applied to this class of cases, we now have the
decision of the principal case which stipulates just what kind
of a hearing must be given to those affected before this sort
of assessment of property is made final.
(183)
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAV (Continued).
A Mississippi statute prohibited certain forms of gambling
in futures and inhibited its courts from giving effect to any
contract based on such gambling. Two citizens
Credit liven
to Judgment, of Mississippi made such a contract and arbitrated
of OtherStates their dispute.
The citizen in whose favor the
award was made brought action thereon in a Missouri court.
Evidence of the illegality of the contract in Mississippi was
rejected and a verdict and judgment were rendered in favor
of the plaintiff; and upon action brought upon such judgment,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi decided that they were not
bound by the Missouri judgment On appeal the Supreme
Court of the United States, by a five to four decision,
Held, that a judgment of a court of a state in which the
cause of action did not arise, but based on an award of arbitration had in the state in which the cause did arise, is conclusive,
and, under the "full faith and credit" clause of the Federal
Constitution, must be given effect in the latter state, notwithstanding the award was for a claim, which could not, under the
laws of that state, have been enforced in any of its courts.
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230.
This decision leads to the interesting conclusion that a state
may be compelled to give effect to an illegal transaction done
within its borders. The court decided that the case fell within
the doctrine laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in Hampton
v. M'Connell, 3 Wheat. 234, "that the judgment of a state
court should have the same credit, validity, and effect in every
other court in the United States which it had in the state where
it was pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to
a suit thereon in such state, and none others, could be pleaded
in any other court of the United States." The court held that
the judgment of the Missouri court in this case was undoubtedly conclusive in Missouri on the validity of the cause of
action and could not be impeached either in or out of the
state by showing that it was based on a mistake of law, (State
v. Trammel, lo6 Missouri 51o,) and therefore, as the jurisdiction of the Missouri court was not disputed, the judgment
could not be impeached in Mississippi, even if it went on a
misapprehension of the Mississippi law. This reasoning
seems unassailable, but a strong minority of the court considered the decision as an unwarranted extension of the
doctrine laid down by Chief Justice Marshall, and one which
might well lead to dangerous results.
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CONTEMPT.
Alleging a breach of the injunction issued in the well known
case of Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540,
the plaintiffs brought this action for contempt.
rEkach of
The testimony showed an honest, untiring effort
InjunctIon
on the part of the defendants to correct the "slips"
which were so injurious to the plaintiff's property, but notwithstanding these efforts, a continuous deposit of the dust
on the premises, though in less amount than formerly. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, overruling the lower court,
held that the resulting injury did not amount to a violation of
the injunction; that the present injury was not the injury enjoined, inasmuch as the present deposits were not of such a
character as to destroy vegetation and kill the orchards, etc.
Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 70 Atl. 775.
It will be remembered that when the nuisance case was
originally heard, it virtually overruled the existing Pennsylvania doctrine as expressed in Richards' Appeal, 57 Pa. io5,
where the court inclined toward the balance of injury test.
The decision, however, placed .the Pennsylvania doctrine in
accord with the English cases such as Pennington v. Brinsop
Co., L. R. 5 Ch. D. 769, and Young v. Bankier Dstillery Co.
App. Cas. (I893) 691, where the only consideration by the
court was whether or not a right of the plaintiff was being
infringed. Whether or not in acquitting of contempt the court
has in some degree receded from its decision in issuing the
injunction is an open question which subsequent decisions will
help to decide. Justice Mestrezat in an able dissenting opinion,
went even further in this view of the court's position, and held
that an acquittal of contempt amounted to an overruling of
the former decision, since the injury was precisely the same
in nature, and differed only in degree.

CONTRACTS.
Where two telephone companies, which were non-competing,
mutually gave up their lines to each other and agreed not to
compete, Held, the contract being one for mutual
Restraintof
Trade
protection, and in no way injurious to the public,
is not illegal as being in restraint of trade. Wayne
Co. v. Ontario Co., 112 N. Y. Supp. 424.

For a full discussion of the principles involved, see Note, p.
169 of this issue.
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CONTRACTS (Continued).
By the Common Law, the benefit of a contract could not be
assigned, except by the crown, so as to enable the assignee
to sue in his own name; and if such assignee
Right of
were not empowered by his assignor to sue in the
Assignee of
Chose in
latter's name, he was forced into long and exAIon
toSuO pensive litigation in Equity, the only court which
In H~s Owiigtonol
Name
recognized his rights (Pollock on Conts. 7th Ed.,
p. 217). The origin of the rule was attributed by
Coke to the "wisdom and policy of the law" in discouraging
maintenance and litigation; but it is better explained as a
logical consequence of the archaic view of a contract as creating
a strictly personal obligation between debtor and creditor
(Spence, Eq. Juris. of Chy., Vol. II, p. 85o), and we find
Blackstone (Vol. II, p. 442). remarking that " the person to
whom it (the 'contract) is transferred is rather an attorney
than an assignee."
However useful the rule may once have been, it has now, because of our more advanced and complicated business methods,
become practically obsolete, and statutes have been passed in
most of our states enabling the assignee to sue in his own
name, as the real party in interest.
Under the Oregon statute covering the question it has been
recently held by the Supreme Court of that State that a judgment creditor having assigned the debt to a bank for collection, and the bank in turn to King, the plaintiff, the latter could
maintain a suit in his own name, after the original parties had
agreed on a compromise (King v. Miller, 97 Pac. Rep. 542).
There are several dicta in the case, but the point in question is
one that would unquestionably be followed in the majority of
jurisdictions to-day.
"It is now a general rule, in construing releases," says C. J.
Shaw (Rich v. Lord, 18 Pick. 325), "that general words,
though the most broad and comprehensive, are to
Right ~
After Releale
be limited to particular demands, where it manifestly appears by the recital, by the consideration,
by the nature and circumstances of the several demands, to
one or more of which it is proposed to apply the release, that
it was so intended to be limited by the parties." This is a
good statement of the rule usually held in cases of release,
and it is generally laid down by text-book writers that a general release does not include demands which neither party
had knowledge of (Parsons on Conts. 626).
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The reason for this rule seems plain: that is the intention of
the parties that should govern in all such agreements, and
therefore that nothing should be enforced that was not contemplated at the time. This being so, the fact that the release
is under seal, should not affect the matter; but though the
cases agree that in a release under seal, if the particular matter
is expressed first and the general words after, the New York
courts imply that if the general words are expressed first, all
action is barred, even to actions which could not have been
known at the time (Kirchner v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co.,
135 N. Y. 182). This language seems rather harsh, and the
authorities cited by the learned judge in that case hardly bear
out the point. There is no question, however, as to the effect
of mere receipts; and the recent holding that when a cargo of
goods had been delivered in apparent good order, save that a
few bundles of shooks came out stained, and a compromise was
effected by deducting $ioo, which was acknowledged by a
receipt "in full settlement of our claim for damages to cargo
delivered in bad condition," the plaintiffs later discovering that
after the shooks had been made up into wine barrels the wine
showed a flavor of creosote-the holding that the previous release did not bar a right of action for odor and taint not discovered until afterward, was perfectly sound, and unquestionable
(Church CooperageCo. v. Pinkney et al., 163 Fed. 653).
CORPORATIONS.
Where the stockholders of a corporation retired all the old
stock and issued new, leaving an interval during which there
was no stock outstanding, Held, the existence
Rtlremetof of the corporation continued, although strictly
Existence
speaking there were no stockholders during the
Without
Stockholders

interval. In re Western Bank and Trust Co., 163

Fed. 713.
For a full discussion see Note, p. 176 of this issue.

DAMAGES.
Under the treaty with Italy, Italian subjects are given certain rights in the United States. Plaintiff brought an action
the Act of 1855 in Pennsylvania to recover
Constitutional under
f
Law:
for
the death of her son, an Italian subject. Held,
Recovery'
for
Death
of Allen

the statute does not extend to non-residents, and

cannot be so extended by the treaty.
Fulco v.
Schuylkill Valley Stone Co., 163 Fed. 124.
For a full discussion see Note, p. 171 of this issue.
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EQUITY.
An execution was levied against A and his property condemned for sale. He brought a bill to enjoin the proceedings
on the ground that he was not the defendant in
.
Against xe
the execution, but that such defendant was ancuton Sale of other person having a name similar to him. Held,
Realty
the bill cannot be entertained, the Court having
no jurisdiction over the case. Mantz v. Kistler, et al., 70
Atlantic 545.
For a full discussion see Note, p. 173 of this issue.
EVIDENCE.
Plaintiff contracted in writing to furnish defendant company with certain machinery. Defendant refused to accept
the machinery and plaintiff sues for breach of
AdrmAslbity contract.
At the trial defendant offered to inment Modify- troduce evidence of a parol agreement entered
Motract"
into at the time the contract was executed to the
effect that work should not be begun until specifications of certain details had been submitted by defendant,
which agreement had not been complied with by plaintiff. This
evidence was excluded by the trial judge. Held, the evidence
was properly excluded. The parol agreement which it was
attempted to set up was clearly inconsistent with the written
contract. Ridgway Co. v. Pa. Cement Co., 70 Atl. 557.
The general rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to
vary a written contract, has been subject to more sweeping exceptions in Pennsylvania, than in any other jurisdiction. Up
to the last quarter of the nineteenth century these exceptions
were so broad as nearly to obliterate the rule, due largely to a
misconception of fraud as applied to contract. But upon the
introduction of the rule allowing parties to testify in their
own behalf, the danger of so loose a doctrine with regard to
parol evidence was seen, and in 1870, the case of Martin v.
Berens, 67 Pa. 459, first narrowed the rule making the test
of admissibility of evidence of a parol, contemporaneous, inducing agreement, whether such agreement if proven could
stand with the written contract and be enforced without contradicting or varying any of its terms. Subsequent cases continued to apply a stricter rule than formerly, but not expressly on this ground, and developed the rule that parol evidence was admissible only when the agreement restricted the
use of the written instrument. Cloud v. Marble, 186 Pa. 614.
However, this principle was not broad enough to apply to all
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EVIDENCE (Continued).
cases, and a large number were therefore decided on unsatisfactory reasoning, no court realizing that the principle of Martin v. Berens would afford a criterion for all such cases. But
this rule was finally hinted at in Fuller v. Law, 207 Pa. ioi,
and now the principal case has been decided expressly on that
ground. It is a logical rule, including the "use" doctrine, and
though broader, is not so much so as to violate the sanctity of a
written contract. It will also explain previous Pennsylvania
cases on this subject, with the exception of those on their face
wrongly decided.
See Article "Admissibility of Evidence," by Stanley Folz,
Esq., in 52 Am. Law Reg. 6oi.

Fisher, while confined in prison on a charge of murder
dictated to a fellow prisoner on two separate occasions lettert
to Fisher's wife. The letters contained incriminating evidence against him. At the trial the letters
Husband In
Prison to Wife were offered in evidence by the district attorney
.aid
a and received by the Court. Defendant excepted
Incriminatory
to their admission. It was not shown at the
Nature Not
Admissible
trial by the district attorney, nor was he requested
thl
Aguait
to state how he got the letters. Subsequent to the
stid
trial the envelopes, in which the letters were alleged to have been enclosed, were produced and appeared to
have been regularly stamped and mailed.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that the admission of the letters as evidence was a violation
of the statute (Act of May 23, 1887 P. L. 158) which provided that "neither husband nor wife shall be competent or
permitted to testify against each other, . .. nor shall either

husband or wife be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made by one to another." The process
of reasoning by which they arrived at this conclusion is
shown by the following quotation from the opinion of Mr.
Justice Elkin, "These facts clearly show that the letters were
placed in due course of transmission in the mails, and the
presumption arises under the rule of our own cases that letters so mailed were delivered to the party addressed. It is
true the evidence does not show how the district attorney got possession of the letters, but the wife having received them, the reasonable presumption is that she gave them
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EVIDENCE (Continued).
to the prosecuting officer. which, in point of fact she did, as is
shown by facts subsequently developed."
A strong dissenting opinion was entered by Mr. Chief Ju ice
litchell, Mr. justice Potter concurring. The grounds for the
dissent are best summed up in the following quotation: "The
conclusion is jumped at by the further presumption that the
wife gave them to the Commonwealth and that in so doing
she was testifying to confidential relations. There is no evidence nor any presumption either of fact or of law to support
such a conclusion. She might just as probably have lost them
by carelessness, or by the treachery of the fellow prisoners whom
the defendant trusted with them in the first place, as they
testified on the stand. It is a very old and very sound law that
a presumption founded on a presumption is not valid." Coinnzonwealth v. Fisher, 221 Pa. 538 (19o8).
It has been repeatedly held that although a letter from
husband to wife is privileged, yet where such a letter has come
into the hands of a third person it may be produced in evidence.
St. v. Hayes, 14o N. Y. 484 (1894); but in a number of jurisdictions the rule is contra; Wilkerson v. St., 91 Ga. 729
(1893) ; Lancelot v. St., 98 Wis. 136 (1897) ; whether the letters were obtained voluntarily or against the wife's will [Scott
v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 511, p. 515 (893)].
In this case it was held that a letter from defendant to his
wife offered in evidence by plaintiff was not competent, where
it was not shown that plaintiff did n6t get possession of it
through the agency or connivance of the wife. (Mahner v.
Strick, 70 Mo. App. 380 (1897), contra. St. v. Hoyt, 47
Conn. 518, p. 540 (188o).
The Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, defining competency is
more than confirmatory of the common law rule. The court
will take notice of such a flagrant error as permitting a husband to testify against his wife, although the error is not
covered by any assignment. Canole v. Allen, 222 Pa. 156
(19o8).
In view of the strict enforcement of the statute it does not
seem unreasonable to place on the district attorney the burden of proving that he did not get the said letters from defendant's wife, especially as the information is often solely
within his knowledge and within that of the wife.
Quaere, whether the fellow prisoners to whom the letters
were dictated are to be regarded as third persons so as to
destroy the privileged character of the letters or may they be
regarded as defendant's amanuenses?
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LIBEL.
In an action for libel, brought against a commercial agency
for an honest but erroneous expression of opinion, causing
damage to plaintiff, held, the fact that defendant
published the communication as a matter of perpma
tion:
sonal profit prevents its ranking in the privileged
CTommercial
class. Mackintosh v. Dunn, L. R. (19o8) App.
Agency
Cas. 390.
For further particulars see Note, p. 178 of this issue.

NEGLIGENCE.
Plaintiff, the vendee of a herd of cattle, sued defendant,
the owner of public stock-yards, for damages resulting from
disease contracted by the cattle while in the yards.
Transfer o
Held, no right of action could pass from the
Action for
Damages
the vendor, in whom it had accrued, to plaintiff,
of the cattle. Eshleman v. Union
the vendee, by the mere sale
Co., 222 Pa. 20.

Stockyards

For a full discussion of the principles involved see Note, p.
i8o of this issue.
PARTNERSHIP.
Ten persons joined in the purchase of certain timber lands
in Texas, each agreeing to pay $945. At the same time they
formed a partnership for the purpose of manuPartners
Con- facturing lumber posts and ties; but the business
struted to be
for which the partnership was formed was never
Co-owners of
carried on. The title to the real estate was taken
Land Held in
Trust for the
in the name of W. J. Puett in trust for the comPartnership
pany and he was elected secretary and treasurer.
Later one of the ten partners sold his interest in the land to the
plaintiff and from that date her name appears on the books
of the company, and she paid from time to time her proportionate share of the taxes. She made the purchase through
Puett. Subsequently Puett sold his interest to Way, one of the
original partners and at the same time executed a deed conveying the real estate to him as trustee. Said conveyance was
made at a meeting of all the persons interested except the
plaintiff, who knew nothing about the transaction until long
afterwards. Subsequently, Way, having purchased all the
interests except that of the plaintiff, sold and conveyed the
land without her knowledge or consent. Plaintiff sued to
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recover the value of her share in said real estate. Jones v.
Way, 97 Pac. 437 Kansas Supreme Court (19o8).
The statement in regard to the right of a partner to dispose
of his interest in the partnership without the consent of the
other partners appears to a clear statement of the law but the
decision is based upon the construction which the Court put
upon the partnership agreement. The only question seems
to be whether this construction is supported by the facts.
In England agreements to carry on business at a future time
do not render the parties to them partners before they actually
do carry on the business. "It is the carrying on of a business, not an agreement to carry it on, which is the test of partnership" (Lindley on Partnership, 7th Ed., p. i5; Partnership Act, i89o, Sect. i, definition of partnership), but in this
country the law seems to* be that, "Partnership dates from
agreement, not from beginning business under it" (Parsons on
Partnership, 2nd Ed., p. 79; Aspinwall v. Willians, i Ohio
84 (1823).

Therefore, it would seem that the conveyance of the land
to Puett "in trust for the company" passed the equitable title to
the partnership unless the partnership agreement was otherwise. The Court "in view of the construction placed upon
the articles of agreement by the parties in this transaction" decided that the persons held the real estate as tenants in common, and therefore each could sell his interest in the real estate
at any time without the consent of his co-tenants.
SALES.
On a petition for an order for leave to foreclose a lien upon,
or to bring an action for the recovery of, stoves installed in
houses built by a bankrupt, the petitioner proved
Valdity of
Codtonal
that the contract of sale of the stoves was conSale
ditioned upon the payment of the price. The
trustee in bankruptcy objected to the granting of the order on
the grounds that the stoves had, by their installation, become
part of the real estate, and that the fact that they would be
second-hand after heating was inconsistent with their return.
Held, that the vendor's property in the stoves before payment of the price as against the bankrupt's trustee was not
impaired by the fact that use of the stoves upon the vendee's
property was inconsistent with the idea of a return to the
seller, nor had they necessarily become a part of the real
estate incapable of continued ownership in the vendor. lit re
Cohen, 163 Fed. 444.
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SALES (Continued).
This case raises a new and interesting point in regard
to the retention of property by the vendor in a conditional
sale. There seems to be no direct authority upon this point,
but the decision appears to be sound in principle.
STATUTES.
The Indian Appropriation Acts of 1895-1899 limited and
forbade the appropriation of funds for the education of Indians in sectarian schools. The question arose
whether this prohibition applied to certain Treaty
. "or
indlan 3duca- and Trust funds which the Commissioner approtlot
priated for education in spite of the Acts. Held,
that the Acts applied only to the appropriation of public money,
and that the moneys in question in reality belonged to the
Indians under the provisions of the Treaty, and under the
nature of the Trust, and hence were not subject to the Acts.
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50.

The case is unique and one practically without precedent
authority. For a great number of years the government had
been making contracts with sectarian schools for the education of Indians, but on account of the abuse of the system for
political ends and in other ways, it was deemed best to reduce,
and at length to abolish all such appropriations, and the Acts
mentioned above were therefore passed. The defendant in
this case renewed the appropriations from the Indian Treaty
fund and from the Trust fund, and the plaintiff applied for an
injunction to restrain such appropriations. It was argued for
the plaintiff that the intention of Congress was clearly to
prohibit all appropriations regardless of the particular fund
from which they were derived. But the court sustained the
contention of the defendant, namely, that since the acts were
introduced under the heading "Support for Schools," they
should apply only to the money appropriated under that head.
As the Treaty and Trust fund appropriations had, up to that
time, been made under separate heads, the prohibitions of the
Acts did not, therefore, apply. It was also contended that the
contracts were in violation of the undenoninational spirit of
the Constitution, but the Court was of opinion that since the
money was in the first place the property of the Indians, they
could choose whatever denomination suited them for their
education.

